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Entering Great America: Reflections on
Race and the Convergence of
Progressive Legal Theory and
Practice
by
MARGARET M. RUSSELL*

In this world-weary period of pervasive cynicisms, nihilisms, terrorisms, and possible extermination, there is a longing for norms and
values that can make a difference, a yearning for principled resistance
and struggle that can change our desperate plight.1
Introduction
Lawyers working for social change have always yearned to "make a
difference" in people's lives as well as in the legal systems in which they
must operate. From the underground railroad to the civil rights movement, from struggles for suffrage to coalitions for reproductive choice,
progressive lawyers have grappled with the structural and ideological
contradictions of their roles as both insurgents and gatekeepers of the
status quo. Given the longstanding existence and apparent unresolvability of these contradictions, the heightened anomie of the
postmodern progressive legal movement is perhaps all the more striking;
activist lawyers of today not only wonder whether they can "make a difference," but also question what such a "difference" means in the context
of a legal system intractably marred by maldistributions of access, resources, and influence. In this search for new theoretical dimensions of
progressive lawyering, practitioners are joined by scholars aiming to
* Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University; A.B. 1979, Princeton University;
J.D. 1984, Stanford University; J.S.M. 1990, Stanford University. I wish to thank the kind
colleagues who commented on earlier drafts of this Essay, as well as the participants in the
1992 Hastings Law Journal-HastingsWomen's Law JournalConference, "Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action." Special gratitude is extended to
Santa Clara University law students Janie Fong '92 and Robert Monti '93 for diligent and
spirited research assistance.
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broaden the jurisprudential canons within which issues of social justice
historically have been discussed.
In this regard, the relatively recent emergence of jurisprudence in

the areas of critical legal studies (CLS),2 feminist theory,3 and critical
race theory4 presents significant opportunities for legal practitioners and
activists who work toward the furtherance of social justice. The relationship between critical theories and lawyering for social change is in many
2. For a sampling of this voluminous and diverse body of scholarship, see Duncan Kennedy & Karl E. Klare, A Bibliographyof CriticalLegal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 461 (1984) and
works cited therein.
3.

See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER (1991); Regina Austin, Sapphire

Boundl, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 539; Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscriminationDoctrine,Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 [hereinafter Crenshaw,
Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex]; Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
ProcessDangersfor Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race andEssentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women
and the Constitution: Finding OurPlace,Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9
(1989).
4. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE]; ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN

INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1990); John 0. Calmore, Exploring the Significance
of Race and Class in Representing the Black Poor, 61 OR. L. REv. 201 (1982); Iimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound:
A Tort Action for RacialInsults, Epithets, andName-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133
(1982); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1991); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989).
I wish to note at this point that certain strands of critical race theory, feminist jurisprudence, and CLS are so thematically intertwined that works drawing upon various combinations of these theories resist singular or easy categorization. Examples of such convergences
can be found in recent critiques emphasizing the need to consider the experiences and perspectives of women of color and lesbians in feminist legal theory. See Austin, supra note 3; Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 3; Grillo, supra note 3;
Harris, supra note 3; Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers. Lesbians as IntimatePartners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 511 (1990); Scales-Trent, supra note 3.
It is instructive to recall as well that elements of feminist and critical race theory emerged
as explicit critiques of perceived shortcomings in CLS. For examples of race scholars' critiques
of CLS, see Symposium, Minority Critiquesof the CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1987); Gerald Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: CriticalLegal
Studies and the Law of Race Relations, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043 (1988); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of CriticalLegal Theory for
Peoples of Color, 5 LAw & INEQ. 103 (1987).
For discussions of the relationship between feminist theory and CLS, see Deborah L.
Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REv. 617 (1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Feminist Legal Theory, CriticalLegal Studies, and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to
Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988).
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respects inherently dialogical and interdependent: a thoughtful approach
to progressive practice has the potential to engender valuable theoretical
and pedagogical insights; 5 genuinely critical scholarship, in turn, can reveal the complexity of issues about which legal precedent and profes6
sional discourse are narrow, stultified, or simply nonexistent.
Increasingly, those who regard themselves as activists and scholars in the
academy openly acknowledge and embrace a commitment, shared with
practitioners, to achieve political and social transformation through the
law. As Professor Harlan Dalton has observed with respect to the growing community of activist legal scholars of color, we are all "practitioners
in one way or another, people committed to pursuing an active program
'7
to change the situation of our people."
Given these nascent possibilities for renewed collaboration between
practitioners and academicians, it is important to remember that we
should construct and sustain a progressive community not only at the
intersection of theory and pr4ctice, but at the multiple crossroads created
from our disparate critical orientations.
In this Essay I explore the relevance of insights from the emerging
field of race theory8 to an analysis of problems experienced on a recurrent basis by members of racially subordinated groups. I focus particularly on the application of these theoretical principles to an
5. See, eg., Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the
Life of a Rebellious Collaboration,77 GEO. L.J. 1603 (1989); Lucie E. White, Subordination,
RhetoricalSurvival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mr G., 38 BUFF. L.
REv. 1 (1990); see generally THE RELEVANT LAWYERS: CONVERSATIONS OUT OF COURT
ON THEIR CLIENTS, THEIR PRACTICE, THEIR POLITIcs, THEIR LIFE STYLE (Ann FaganGinger ed., 1972) [hereinafter THE RELEVANT LAWYERS].
6. See, e-g., Dwight L. Greene, Drug Decriminalization:A Chorus in Need of Masterrap's Voice, 18 HOFsTRA L. REv. 457 (1990) (arguing that the formulation of national drug
policy should include the perspectives and strategies of communities directly affected by rampant drug abuse and law enforcement excesses); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991) (discussing
battering within the context of the prevalence of societal violence against women and calling
for the recognition of "separation assault" as a doctrinal concept in domestic abuse cases).
7. Harlon L. Dalton, The Clouded Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 435,435 (1987).
8. Professor Kimberl6 Crenshaw has described critical race theory as follows:
It shares with liberal race critiques a view that law has provided an arena for challenging white supremacy. Critical race theory goes beyond the liberal critiques,
however, in that it exposes the facets of law and legal discourse that create racial
categories and legitimate racial subordination.
•.. The normative stance of critical race theory is that massive social transformation is a necessary precondition of racial justice.
Kimberlb Williams Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of AntidiscriminationLaw and Politics,
in THE PoLmics OF LAW 195, 213-14 n.7 (David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter
Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique].
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understanding of one of the most serious discriminatory practices faced
by minority communities today: the proliferation of appearance-based
"gang profiles" used with increasing frequency by law enforcement agencies, public accommodations, and private businesses in order to screen
out "undesirables." 9 In my view, ostensibly neutral institutional practices such as "proffling" in fact reflect deeply embedded stereotypes of
people of color, and perpetuate the misguided notion that complex social
problems-in this case, the involvement of some young people of color in
street gangs and street violence---can be resolved primarily through punitive measures.
This Essay is divided into four parts. In the next Part I discuss ways
in which critical theory and practice in the area of race relations are not
only intertwined, but mutually responsive and beneficial. In particular, I
posit that critical race theory can be viewed as the continuation of a radical tradition of theory as progressive practice, and that some of its
emerging tenets and methodologies hold considerable promise for practitioners committed to lawyering for racial justice. In Part II I apply these
observations to the problem of "gang proffling"; I focus especially on the
case of the Great America amusement park in California, which implemented but later was persuaded to abandon a "gang proffle" policy that
operated to exclude (almost solely) young African-American and Latino
males on the ground that they "looked" dangerous. Finally, I conclude
with a brief assessment of the role of critical race theory in the larger
struggle for social change in the law.
I.

The Practice of Theoretics: Race Consciousness and the
Rule of Law

A central theme of critical race critiques is that liberal ideologies
such as formal equality, colorblindness and procedural justice often conceal, or at least fail to take into account, structural dynamics in the law
which perpetuate systemic racial subordination. These underlying structural flaws, which include persistent poverty, unconscious racism and
sexism, function in turn as silent yet powerful reinforcements in the
maintenance of legal and economic barriers to true racial equality.
Accordingly, race theorists assert, those committed to fundamental
social and political change should lend their energies not only to the
"practice" of lawyering and organizing, but to the "practice" of theoretical deconstruction and reconstruction as well. I briefly discuss below
9. For detailed descriptions of gang profiles from a law enforcement perspective, see
infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
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two aspects of this "practice of theoretics": visions of "theory as practice" in critical race literature; and evolving methodologies by which
these visions find implementation as tools for practice.
A. Visions of Theory as Practice
...I am myself-a Black woman warrior
poet doing my work-come to ask you,
are you doing yours?10
The "work" of which Audre Lorde writes is that of poetry and education in the furtherance of liberation. As a scholar and poet who is
also-and, she emphasizes, inextricably-African-American, lesbian,
and feminist, Lorde reveals in passages such as the above a vision of her
work as a fusion of theory and praxis. She observes:
In the forefront of our move toward change, there is only poetry to
hint at possibility made real. Our poems formulate the implications of
ourselves, what we feel within and dare make real (or bring action into
accordance with), our fears, our hopes, our most cherished terrors.11
In Lorde's view, then, the forcefulness of poetry derives not only from its
aesthetic power but from its instrumental potential as well.
Similarly, much of the work of critical race scholars proceeds both
from the explicit commitment to "move toward change" and from the
assessment that law occupies a central role in defining and circumscribing the possibilities "made real"' 12 for people of color. In accordance
with Lorde's declaration that "[p]oetry is not a luxury," 13 critical race
scholars would add that legal theory should not be either; rather, legal
theory can serve an essential purpose in analyzing and dismantling pervasive attitudes of racial oppression and hatred.
This conceptualization of theory as practice finds direct antecedents
in African-American political and literary traditions. These traditions
are premised upon the recognition that African-American intellectual
work and cultural production are fundamentally radical acts in a society
10. AUDRE LORDE, The Transfonnation ofSilence Into Languageand Action, in SISTER
OTrrSIDER 41-42 (1984).
11. AUDRE LORDE, Poetry Is Not A Luxury, in SISTER OUTSIDER, supra note 10, at 39.

Lorde also notes:
It is a vital necessity of our existence. It forms the quality of the light within which
we predicate our hopes and dreams toward survival and change, first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible action. Poetry is the way we help give
name to the nameless so it can be thought. The farthest horizons of our hopes and
fears are cobbled by our poems, carved from the rock experiences of our daily lives.
Id. at 37.
12. Id. at 39.
13. Id. at 37.
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which historically has defined African-Americans as subhuman and incapable of self-definition. In explaining the distinctive role of autobiography as an African-American literary genre, Professor Henry Louis Gates
observes that many noted black authors have published their life stories
early rather than late in their careers; he attributes this phenomenon to
the necessity felt by the African-American intellectual to "shape" a public self in language as an act of resistance against a culture which systematically sought to erase that self.1 4 Professor Gates comments:
Deprived of access to literacy, the tools of citizenship, denied the rights
of selfhood by law, philosophy, and pseudo-science, and denied as well
the possibility, even, of possessing a collective history as a people,
black Americans--commencing with the slave narratives in 1760published their individual histories in astonishing numbers, in a larger
attempt to narrate the collective history of "the race." If the individual black self could not exist before the law, it could, and would, be
forged in language, as a testimony at once to the supposed integrity of
the black self and against the social and political evils that delimited
individual and group equality for all African-Americans. 15
Joining that tradition, critical race theory seeks to draw upon the insights
and experiences of individuals subjected to discrimination in order to
forge a race conscious "legal self."
In furtherance of this overarching vision of theory as practice, critical race scholarship presently reflects a wide-ranging array of approaches. While noting that a particular piece may reflect an amalgam
of different objectives, I wish to note at this point two distinctive strands
of the literature. One approach focuses on the documentation of specific
policies and practices in the legal arena that fail to take into account the
experiences and perspectives of people of color, and proposes doctrinal
and policy reforms to ameliorate these shortcomings. 16 The nexus between this critical approach and progressive lawyering is relatively easy
to discern; the insights offered by such works are both descriptive and
prescriptive, and can serve as a fairly well delineated overview of or
blueprint for future litigation, lobbying, and organizing efforts.
A second approach explores the extent to which seemingly reified
legal categories and boundaries are in fact socially constructed and there14. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Introduction On Bearing Witness, in BEARING WITNESS:
SELECTIONS FROM AFRICAN-AMERICAN AUTOBIOGRAPHY IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 34 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. ed., 1991).
15. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).

16. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Voices ofAmerica: Accent, AntidiscriminationLaw, anda
Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) [hereinafter Matsuda,
Voices of America]; Dorothy Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1419 (1991).
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fore mutable. 17 A primary example of this strand is the literature on
what Professor Kimberl6 Crenshaw has termed the "intersectionality" of
race and gender-that is, the ways in which mainstream jurisprudence
not only fails to accommodate claims of discrimination differentially experienced by women of color, but also resists the implications of these
differences for norms otherwise assumed to be universal, neutral, and
apolitical.' 8 The practical implications of this theoretical strand are perhaps less immediate and concrete than those of the more "policy-oriented" approach, but they are proffered in the literature as equally
important steps in the resolution of recurrent legal dilemmas. And, as
mentioned above, much critical race scholarship draws upon both approaches in order to discuss a specific legal problem and the broader historical and political context in which it occurs. 19
Finally, in discussing visions of theory as practice, it is appropriate
to note the parallel development of race theorists' efforts to broaden the
canons of legal scholarship and similar movements in other academic
disciplines. As Henry Louis Gates, bell hooks, 20 and other scholars in
the humanities have sought to question traditional boundaries of their
fields of inquiry, critical race scholars seek to reformulate the categories
and doctrines through which lawyers (and nonlawyers) comprehend the
law. While warning that abstractions and essentialized thinking about
race, without continuous attention to and connection with real community concerns, could easily degenerate into a fashionable infatuation with
"discourses about difference,"' 2 1 these writings acknowledge and explore
the need for a new theoretical baie around which people committed to
racial equality can mobilize.22 Elements of this emerging fusion of the17.

See, eg., Gotanda, supra note 4; Harris, supra note 3; see also Judy Scales-Trent,

Commonalities: On BeingBlack and White, Different and the Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
305 (1990).
18. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 3.
19. See, eg., Matsuda, Voices of America, supra note 16 (first using social science literature to argue that perceptions of accent comprehensibility are socially constructed and filtered
through personal bias; then proposing modifications of Title VII doctrine in accent discrimination cases to address perceptual shortcomings).
20. See BELL HOOKS, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL POLITICS (1990)
[hereinafter HOOKS, YEARNING]; BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST,
THINKING BLACK (1989); BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER
(1984).
21. bell hooks, Postmodern Blackness, in HOOKS, YEARNING, supra note 20, at 23.
22. Comments hooks:
Committed cultural critics-whether white or black, scholars or artists--can produce work that opposes structures of domination, that presents possibilities for a
transformed future by willingly interrogating their own work on aesthetic and political grounds. This interrogation itself becomes an act of critical intervention, fostering a fundamental attitude of vigilance rather than denial.
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ory and practice can be found in the language of scholars such as Professor Richard Delgado, who submits a "plea for narrative" 23 as a critical
aspect of antiracist work; Professor Patricia Williams, who urges the

hard labor of "boundary-crossing" 24 to combat racial and ethnic stereo-

types; and Professor Angela Harris, who observes that an essential part
of her role in the academy is "education work" 25 to foster empathy for

minorities.
B. Methodologies of Theory as Practice
While generalizations about critical race methodologies would at
this point be premature, the literature to date has reflected at least two
strong themes which bear mention as part of the theoretics/practice dialectic: the use of narrative or "storytelling" to deepen the reader's awareness of and empathy with voices historically excluded from legal
discourse;26 and explicit reference to diverse scholarly traditions and disciplines as valuable sources of insight into discrimination that cannot be
explained through legal analysis alone. 2 7 A brief discussion of the relationship between these methodologies and progressive practice follows.
bell hooks, Critical Interrogation: Talking Race, Resisting Racism, in HOOKS, YEARNING,
supra note 20, at 55.
23. Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionistsand Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2411 (1989). Professor Delgado continues:
Most who write about storytelling focus on its community-building functions: stories
build consensus, a common culture of shared understandings, and deeper, more vital
ethics. Counterstories, which challenge the received wisdom, do that as well. They
can open new windows into reality, showing us that there are possibilities for life
other than the ones we live.
Id. at 2414.
24. Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on FormalEqual Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128, 2151 (1989). Professor Williams explains: "I think that the hard
work of a non-racist sensibility is the boundary-crossing, from safe circle into that wilderness:
the testing of boundary, the consecration of sacrilege." Id.
25. Angela P. Harris, On Doing the Right Thing: Education Work in the Academy, 15
VT. L. REv. 125, 125-26 n.3 (1990). Drawing upon Professor Williams' "boundary-crossing"
metaphor, Professor Harris opines that minority faculty at majority institutions have a special
obligation to challenge bigotry despite the fact that "[t]he practical, emotional, and moral
burdens of doing education work are heavy." Id. at 134.
26. For examples of recent scholarship on narrative and the law, see Symposium, Legal
Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989), and Symposium, Pedagogy of Narrative, 40 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990).
27. In emphasizing the need for an interdisciplinary, historical approach to the law, critical race theory shares in certain respects a perspective earlier promulgated by the law and
society movement. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38
STAN. L. REv. 763 (1986).
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(1) Narrative
In a general sense, narratives have occupied a central role in the
legal system for as long as disputes have been recorded. Regarding the
coalescence of this heightened interest in storytelling into a form of narrative jurisprudence, Professor Kim Lane Scheppele notes, "[P]erhaps
it's that law has always been concerned with narratives, with the individual plaintiff and the individual defendant in the individual case, so that
28
theoretical attention to narrative was bound to emerge eventually."
Critical race scholarship's use of narratives broadens the heuristic scope
traditionally accorded to legal storytelling by engaging in what Professor
Cornel West terms "analytical storytelling" 29-the work of "politically
engaged narrators who tell analytically illuminating stories about how
'30 Of
the law has impeded or impelled struggles for justice and freedom."
course, the history of legal storytelling-whether by a trial lawyer in
closing argument or by a judge in a written opinion-has long revealed
narrative's capacity to educate, provoke, and inspire; however, the difference between the traditional and the modern approach is that the latter
explicitly focuses on analytical storytelling as a methodology of theory as
practice.
For example, consider Professor Delgado's description of the catalytic role of storytelling:
We believe that stories, parables, chronicles and narratives are potent
devices for analyzing mindset and ideology-the bundle of pre-suppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of which legal discourse takes place .... [T]he main cause of
Black and brown subordination is not so much poorly crafted or enforced laws or judicial decisions. Rather, it is the prevailing mindset
through which members of majority race justify the world as it 3is....
1
The cure is storytelling... to quicken and engage conscience.
28. Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. Rnv. 2073, 2073 (1989)
(emphasis in original).
29. Cornel West, The Role ofLaw in ProgressivePolitics,in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra
note 8, at 468, 474.
30. Id. at 473. Professor West notes:
The role of progressive lawyers is not only to engage in crucial defensive practicesliberal practice vis-i-vis the courts-but also to preserve, recast, and build on the
traces and residues of past conflicts coded in laws. This latter activity is guided by a
deep historical sensibility that not only deconstructs the contradictory character of
past and present legal decisions or demystifies the power relations operative in such
decisions; it also concocts empowering and enabling narratives that cast light on how
these decisions constitute the kind of society in which we live and how people resist
and try to transform it.
Id.
31. Scheppele, supra note 28, at 2075 (quoting a letter from Richard Delgado to Kevin
Kennedy, June 1, 1988).
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Narrative is also used in critical scholarship as a method for eliciting
and empowering rarely heard perspectives from subordinated communities. For example, a scholar's documentation of a battered woman's decision to "tell my story and use my name" 32 accords respect to that
woman's voice. Similarly, when Professor Regina Austin draws upon
the real-life story of Crystal Chambers in exhorting African-American
female scholars to study and resolve African-American women's legal
problems, 33 she seeks to authenticate these women's priorities and experiences. In much the same way that a seasoned practitioner reminds herself of fleeting but profound moments with individual clients as a way of
combating the fatigue and alienation of long-term practice,3 4 a scholar
employs narrative methodology to remind both herself and her readers
that urgent human needs lie beneath abstract legal theories.35
(2) InterdisciplinaryPerspectives
It is, perhaps, by now truistic that all good lawyers are generalists.
Drawing from a hybrid of common sense, knowledge, experience, borrowed expertise, and sheer gumption, lawyers who work for social
change are no exception. In fact, as our judiciary, government, and social institutions continue to drift seemingly inexorably toward conservatism and retrenchment, progressive practitioners must rely even more on
ideas, skills, and strategies developed in other arenas to remedy injustices
that the current legal system is unable or unwilling to address.
In a related manner, a central theme of much critical race scholarship is an explicit intention to draw upon diverse disciplines and theoretical traditions in order to question and reconfigure the conventional
boundaries of debate about race, racism, and the law. Several scholars
have embraced this interdisciplinary approach both to express and ame32. Mahoney, supra note 6, at 1 n.*.
33. In SapphireBoundl, supra note 3, Professor Austin uses the story of Crystal Chambers, a pregnant African-American woman discharged from her position as counselor in a
girls' club in Nebraska, to illustrate her assertion that the dominant culture stigmatizes independent African-American women with the pejorative label of "Sapphire."
34. Unfortunately, there is far too little literature on the long-term experiences of progressive lawyers. For a noteworthy recent contribution, see J.L. CHESTNUT & JULIA CASS,
BLACK IN SELMA: THE UNCOMMON LIFE OF J.L. CHESTNUT, JR. (1990). For other interesting insights, see CHARLES GARRY & ART GOLDBERG, STREETFIGHTER IN THE COURTROOM
(1977); ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL: THE ODYSSEY OF A PEOPLE'S LAWYER (1983);
THE RELEVANT LAWYERS, supra note 5. On the subject of the perils of alienation among
long-term practitioners, see Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power andBreaking Images:
CriticalLegal Theory and the Practiceof Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369, 369,
375-379 (1982-83).
35. See, e.g., White, supra note 5; Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).
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liorate their disillusionment with predominant civil rights ideologies;
Professor Derrick Bell's use of historical, sociological, and literary
materials in his "chronicles" about race is one example of this eclectic
method.3 6 Another prominent example is Professor Charles Lawrence's
use of psychoanalytic literature to develop a theory of the role of uncon37
scious racism in the perpetuation of widespread societal discrimination.
In these works and others, interdisciplinary methodologies serve to elucidate the pervasive influence of racism in this nation's culture. Such insights can lead in turn to a more expansive and eclectic vision of
lawyering, particularly in an era in which interactions with the courts are
increasingly unsuccessful.
In the next Part I apply several of the principles discussed above to
the problem of "gang profiling," a rapidly growing phenomenon in both
public and private settings. As explained below, gang profiling reflects
deeply inscribed stereotypes about people of color, particularly young
African-American, Latino, and Asian males. In many cases these gang
profiles actually operate as "appearance" profiles, the effect of which is to
label people of color as "dangerous" on the basis of their physiognomies.
I begin with the stories of a number of young men who have been victimized by the discriminatory use of appearance profiles.
II.

The Theoretics of Practice: Understanding and Challenging
Gang Profiles

As the above section indicates, a theoretical approach to progressive
lawyering requires that particular attention be accorded to the untold
narratives of individual clients and client communities disadvantaged by
legal and institutional practices. Therefore, it is helpful to begin this exploration of gang profiling with the individual stories of those who have
borne the brunt of their implementation.
A.

38
The Great America Incidents

On the Fourth of July in 1990 eight seventeen- and eighteen-yearold Latino males from San Mateo and Redwood City, California decided
to go to Great America, an amusement park in Santa Clara, California.
Before reaching the park, the youths divided into several groups; four of
them-Jerry Ramirez-Claire, Rigo Rodriguez, Adrian Morales, and
36. BELL, supra note 4.
37. Lawrence, supra note 4.
38. The following account of the Great America incidents may be found in Plaintiffs'
First Amended Complaint, Garcia v. Great America, No. 712978 (Santa Clara County Super.
Ct. 1991) (on file with author).
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David Garcia-paid their admission fees, parked their cars, and prepared
to enter. 39 As they approached the gates on a well-traveled public path
alongside a fence, they were surrounded by Great America security
guard cars, which blocked all avenues of departure. Park officers approached the four, accused them of being gang members, and informed
them that they could enter the park only if they separated into groups of
two or three. The youths divided into pairs but were stopped a few steps
later by more officers. This time the questions were more insistent:
What race were they? Where did they come from? San Mateo? Redwood City? East Palo Alto? 4° The officers decided that the young men's
answers and appearance indicated gang membership, threatened them
with arrest for trespass, and demanded that they leave the park. The
41
four left.
That same day seventeen-year-old Roger Prieto and nineteen-yearold Anthony Scozzari also visited Great America. 42 Unlike the four
before them, however, Prieto and Scozzari were permitted to pay the
admission price and enter the park. After several hours in Great
America, Prieto and Scozzari decided to try the White Water Rapids, a
popular roller-coaster type of ride that often drenches its riders with
huge splashes of water. As Prieto exited the ride, his pants soaked and
sagging, he and Scozzari were approached by a park official. Again, a
litany of questions ensued: What's your nationality? Where do you
live?4 3 Based on their answers and Prieto's "sagging pants" (ostensibly
an indicator of gang membership), the park official accused them of belonging to a Mexican gang and ejected them from the park.44 As the
young men departed, they were approached by more officers, who arrested, handcuffed, and battered them. Scozzari was particularly brutally treated; an officer bent his fingers so far back that they made
cracking noises, grabbed Scozzari by the hair, and slammed his entire
body onto the cement ground.45 Scozzari and Prieto were then taken to
a mobile police station on the grounds of the park, where they were
46
charged with trespass, further harassed, and placed in a holding cel.
Such incidents were not a Fourth of July anomaly. Great America's
39.
40.
1991, at
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 12-13.
GreatAmerica Challengedfor Excluding Minority Youths, ACLU NEWS, Aug.-Sept.
2.
Complaint, supra note 38, at 12-13.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
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gang profile policy had been in effect for some time, and park officials
readily acknowledged their practice of ejecting people whose appearance,
in their view, "indicated" gang membership. 47 Later that year, on September 30, 1990, park guards stopped Chiyuka Carlos, Michael Dawson,
and Laban Wade, three young African-American males who had traveled to the park to attend a concert. The young men were singled out
from the crowd, ostensibly because their attire-identical "Joe Boxer"style pajamas with a green billiard ball print, and deliberately mismatched tennis shoes-fit the park's gang profile. When Carlos, Dawson, and Wade asked what they had done wrong, the officers' remarks
became derisive and threatening, suggesting that they would have to
leave because they were similarly attired black men and that that was
enough. 48 That same day, Nkrumah Prescod and Orange Richardson IV
were thrown out of the park as well because of their styles of clothing
and because, according to the park officers, they were "niggers" who
49
"don't know how to act."9
These stories are only a sampling of the harassing incidents endured
by young men of color, often on a daily basis, because of formal and
informal gang profiles. Such proffiles are being adopted with increasing
frequency by public law enforcement agencies, schools, and private entities such as stores and amusement parks. In 1991 a group of seventeen
youths brought suit in California state court to challenge Great
America's gang profile. In addition to the above-named youths, the
plaintiffs included: a fourteen-year-old Latino male who was stopped because of his manner of dress, interrogated about his race and national
origin, searched, handcuffed, arrested, and taken to juvenile hall for suspicion of gang membership;5 0 and an eighteen-year-old Filipino and Latino male who was detained, asked about his nationality and gang
affiliation, and ejected from the park after officials made a "permanent
record" of his name, race, and address. 51 Of the seventeen plaintiffs, only
one was white: a nineteen-year-old male who had been ejected twice
from Great America with his African-American and Latino friends, the
47. Although Great America readily conceded the existence of an informal "gang profile" policy, it has never disclosed with any specificity the criteria of which such a policy was
comprised. A few isolated items of apparel have been mentioned as "gang signifiers"--e.g.,
"acid-washed jeans" and "overalls"-but a comprehensive description of the policy has never
been proffered. Interview with David Drummond, Co-counsel for Plaintiffs (Jan. 12, 1992)
(notes on file with author).
48. GreatAmerica Challengedfor Excluding Minority Youths, supra note 40, at 2.
49. Complaint, supra note 38, at 24-25.
50. Id. at 3, 18-19.
51. Id. at 3, 19-20.
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second time with a warning that he had better stop "hanging around

with the wrong crowd." 52 As a result of negotiations between the plaintiffs and Great America during 1990 and early 1991, the park agreed to

terminate its policy.

However, the plaintiffs' remaining claims seek

damages from Great America and the City of Santa Clara, and damages
and injunctive relief from the Santa Clara County Sheriff's Department
for its alleged role in assisting Great America in the formulation of the
53
gang profile policy.
B.

The Race-Based Nature of Gang Profiles

Imagine for a moment that the incidents recounted above had been
stripped of all references to racial and ethnic identity: "de-race" 5 4 the
names, descriptions, and epithets used and replace them with ethnically

"unidentifiable," color-neutral terms. Then ask yourself whether the stories resonate differently because of this (literally) facial alteration and, if
they do, why this might be so. Then try to clear your mind again and
envision that these incidents are once again "raced," but that this time
they all involve white individuals. Again, do the stories evoke different
insights? If so, why?
This mini-exercise in shifting perceptions is offered as an illustration
of an underlying objective of critical race theory: to identify race as a
central rather than marginal factor in defining and explaining individual
52. Id. at 5, 16-18.
53. Interview with David Drummond, Co-counsel for Plaintiffs, (Jan. 17, 1992) (notes on
file with author).
In addition to the Great America case, there have also been challenges to the gang profile
policy at Six Flags Magic Mountain amusement park in Valencia, California. In 1988, for
example, a Latino family fied suit against Magic Mountain, alleging that they were stopped in
the parking lot after a security guard looked into their vehicle and called out, "Hey, there's a
bunch of Mexicans in that van." Park guards ordered the family members out of the van,
searched them, and ejected them from the park because their fourteen-year-old son was wearing a black Le Tigre shirt. Also in 1988 nine African-American males in a multiracial Christian youth group were singled out by guards from a crowd of predominantly white teenagers at
Magic Mountain; they were harassed, questioned, and searched for drugs and weapons. When
the detention yielded no incriminating evidence, the young men were finally allowed into the
park with the rest of their group. Interview with Carol Sobel, Staff Counsel, American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) of Southern California (Jan. 28, 1992) (notes on file with author).
Both cases were settled and the formal gang policy was discontinued.
54. I attribute this concept to Professor Kendall Thomas, who notes that race is a social
construction and that individuals are "raced" through the pervasive and ineluctable assignation of ideological and cultural meanings to racial and ethnic status. Professor Kendall
Thomas, Comments at Panel on Critical Race Theory, Conference on Frontiers of Legal
Thought, Duke Law School (Jan. 26, 1990) (tape on ifie with author). "De-race"-ing is no
doubt an impossible conceptual task, for reasons explained in the text accompanying this note
and notes 55-59. However, the futility of the attempt may prove instructive in seeking to
understand that racism is deeply embedded in our legal culture.
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experiences of the law. By acknowledging racism as the overarching affliction of the American legal system, we may begin to explore the more
complex dynamics embodied in facially neutral rules, institutions, and
attitudes. Toward that end, attention to differences of racial perspective
is not just helpful, but necessary. 55
In this regard, the usefulness of race consciousness and racial contextuality is amply illustrated in Professor Patricia Williams' discussion
of the 1987 trial of Bernhard Goetz, the white "subway vigilante" who
shot four African-American teenagers in a New York subway after they
approached him for money.5 6 Noting the context of anti-African-American racial animosity in which the trial occurred and was publicized, Professor Williams uses a "race-switching" vignette to suggest that Goetz's
acquittal and public absolution were dependent upon his whiteness.
Closely tracking the details of Goetz's videotaped confession but inverting the setting and the races of the individuals involved, Professor
Williams writes:
A lone black man was riding in an elevator in a busy downtown department store. The elevator stopped on the third floor, and a crowd
of noisy white high school students got on. The black man took out a
gun, shot as many of them as he could, before the doors opened on the
first floor and the rest fled for their lives. The black man later explained to the police that he could tell from the "body language" of the
students, from "shiny eyes and big smiles," that they wanted to "play
with him, like a cat plays with a mouse." Further, the black man explained, one of the youths had tried to panhandle money from him and
another asked him "how are you?" "That's a meaningless thing," he
said in his
confession, but "in certain circumstances, that can be a real
57
threat."

Because of the pervasive and unspoken role of racial perspective in
our legal culture, Professor Williams' race-inverted version of Goetz's
confession would never "make sense" in the way that his actual rendition
did.5 8 The pragmatic objective of such "race-switching" techniques is to
underscore the profoundly debilitating effect of racism on the apparent
rationality of our perceptions and attitudes. Race-conscious practice incorporates this insight as a critical component of educative and persuasive advocacy.
55. A similar argument may be advanced using gender, class, sexual orientation, and
other socially constructed categories as a basis for rule critique. For examples of such critiques
in the areas of critical legal studies, feminist theory, and lesbian and gay jurisprudence, see
supra notes 2-4.
56.

WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE, supra note 4, at 73-78.

57. Id. at 76.
58. Id. at 76-77.
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In this vein, it is possible to address the racial implications of institutional gang profiles by examining the historical and political context in
which they have proliferated. In recent years, communities across the
United States have reported a surge in gang activity, particularly among
young people in urban areas. 59 Considered by many to be a primary
source of drug dealing, drug-related crimes, and street and school violence, youth gangs have received an enormous amount of attention from
law enforcement agencies and the media. Although the relevant literature from both social scientists and law enforcement specialists differ
considerably in their assessments of the causes, growth, and extent of
gang violence in recent years, 6° gangs have emerged in the current political context as a major focus of law enforcement strategies. Juvenile law
expert Susan Burrell notes:
The primary approach is a war model. Los Angeles Police Chief Darryl Gates has compared his officers to a military force, and the gangs to
a hostile defending force. "It's like having the Marine Corps invade an
area that is still having little pockets' 61of resistance... We can't have it
...We've got to wipe them out."
With disturbing consistency, the battlegrounds for such law enforcement invasions have turned out to be the nation's minority communities,
and "the enemy" has been defined more broadly to encompass in effect
"suspicious-looking" young men of color. For example, Burrell reports
that the Los Angeles Police Department's "Operation Hammer" is a farranging "sweep" program which in 1988 resulted in the arrests of over
24,000 individuals, of whom nearly half were found by police not to be
gang members. 62 Such antigang sweep tactics are employed in other ur59.

For a compelling recent study of contemporary urban gangs in the United States, see

MARTIN SANCHEZ JANKOWSKI, ISLANDS IN THE STREET: GANGS AND AMERICAN URBAN

SOCIETY (1991). Professor Jankowski observes:
[G]angs emerge not as a result of disorganization and/or the desire to find order and
safety, but as a consequence of a particular type of social order associated with lowincome neighborhoods in American society. Low-income areas in American cities
are, in fact, organized, but they are organized around an intense competition for, and
conflict over, the scarce resources that exist in these areas.
Id. at 22.
60. In addition to Jankowski, supra note 59, other leading recent studies include: JOAN
W. MOORE, GOING DOWN TO THE BARRIO: HOMEBOYS AND HOMEGIRLS IN CHANGE
(1991); and I. SPERGEL, YOUTH GANGS: PROBLEM AND RESPONSE: A REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE (ASSESSMENT: PART I), NATIONAL YOUTH GANG SUPPRESSION AND INTERVENTION PROJECT (1990).

61. Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issuesfor CriminalDefense, 30 SANTA CLARA L.
REy. 739, 741-742 (1990). I wish to thank Susan L. Burrell for her helpful perspectives on the
subject of gang profiles and juvenile gangs in general.
62. Id. at 743, n.16 (citing Overend & Baker, Total MurdersDown Despite Record High
in Gang Killings, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1989, at II-1, col. 6).
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ban communities as well. Burrell further recounts the experience of an
African-American youth who reported being stopped and searched repeatedly on the streets of Oakland: "'You can't even stand on the street
here.... It's like South Africa. If you don't have I.D., they take you to

jail.'

"63

Although the youths subjected to such searches may experience
them as arbitrary and race-based, law enforcement agencies assert that
particularized "gang identifiers" form the basis for their selection of individuals and groups. Interestingly, however, these "gang identifiers" are
conceptualized and developed specifically along racial and ethnic group
lines.
For example, in a manual circulated by the Contra Costa County
Deputy Sheriffs' Association, 64 California youth gangs are categorized on
the basis of race and ethnicity; in turn, each racial or ethnic gang is characterized by specific items of clothing, slang, and other cultural identifiers. The listing for "Hispanic Gangs" includes the following "gangidentified" apparel: "Campo Hat" (blue denim cap); "Watch Cap" (dark
knit cap pulled down to cover the ears with a small roll at the bottom);
"Bandana" (different colors, folded lengthwise, and tied in the back);
"Hat" ("stingy" brims or baseball caps, sometimes with a nickname written on the bill); "Pendleton Shirt" (buttoned at the collar and cuffs, remaining front buttons unfastened). Other clothing listed as "Hispanic
gang identifiers" are T-shirts, undershirts, khaki pants, blue jeans, tennis
65
shoes, and shiny leather shoes.
Listings for other groups are equally wide-ranging and problematic.
Consider the "known gang identifiers" for "Asian Gangs": Fila Brand
sports clothing; military fatigue shirts or black jackets; camouflage military clothing in combination with black or other dark clothing; baggy
clothing; and business suits or other "conventional clothing. ' 66 The
manual describes "Black Gangs" in the following manner: "There are
two basic types of gang clothing. First is the type that will lead the observer to the conclusion that the individual belongs to a gang without
specifically identifying which gang.... The second type of gang clothing
specifically identifies a gang." 67 Nowhere in the manual is there an explanation of how an observer might discern the difference between gang
63. Id. (quoting Cooper, Caught in the Crossfire, S.F. EXAMINER, Image Magazine, Aug.
13, 1989, at 7-8).
64.

GROUPS
65.
66.
67.

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS' ASS'N, STREET VIOLENCE/GANGS,

AND CULTS (1990) (on file with author).
Id. at 45.
Id. at 61, 63.
Id.at 51.
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members dressed in the above fashions and similarly garbed non-gang
members.
As the above passages demonstrate, not only clothes but race and
ethnicity are essential components of law enforcement decisions regarding gang membership. This ready conflation of race and ethnicity with
culpability is particularly disturbing given the fact that young people of
color are often deemed "suspicious" for wearing apparel that usually
goes unnoticed when worn by their white peers. 68 Through the unquestioned syllogism that appearance is equivalent to danger, gang profiles
foster the illusion that concrete community concerns can be addressed by
broad incursions into the individual liberties of those who happen to have
69
the "wrong" physiognomies and demographic characteristics.
C. Addressing Community Concerns
With the realization that institutional gang profiles are being used to
define "undesirability" on the basis of racial and ethnic background, how
might a progressive practitioner draw upon the insights of critical race
theory to support community efforts to combat both gang violence and
the erosion of individual rights? I suggest three ways to begin such a
dialogue.
First, it is important to use our legal skills to make explicit the role
of racism, both conscious and unconscious, in institutional assessments
of what and who pose the greatest threats to community safety and dignity. Using the Great America incidents as a paradigmatic "dilemma" of
the tension between community concerns about safety and community
commitment to freedom, it is possible to insist that the resolution of such
a dilemma must not include the abandonment of individual liberties of
people of color. By challenging gang profiles as ideological as well as
legal and institutional constructs, the practitioner can use theory in the
service of long-range systemic change.
A second and related approach is to draw upon narrative more extensively as a methodology for education and advocacy. Often, the so68. Consider, for example, the implications of subjecting all youths, or white youths only,
to a broad profile including popular items of apparel such as baggy pants, caps, and Pendleton
shirts.
69. Recently, a group of civil rights organizations in Northern California lobbied successfully for the elimination of a so-called "Asian mug book" that had been used by the San Jose
Police Department to investigate gang violence in the Asian community. The "mug book"
consisted of photographs solely of Asian individuals (a number of whom had not been charged
with a crime) which were displayed to complainants for purposes of "identifying" suspects.
Donna Yamashiro, Staff Attorney, Asian Law Alliance, Remarks at Panel on Anti-Asian Bias,
Santa Clara University (Apr. 20, 1992) (notes on file with author).
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called "solutions" to community problems proposed by lawyers, law enforcement agencies, and other institutional actors are seriously lacking in
responsiveness to the concerns of the communities themselves. In this
regard, active and analytical storytelling can elicit perspectives rarely
taken into account in more conventional forms of litigation, policymaking, and organizing. Increased attention to client narratives such as
those of the Great America plaintiffs can serve to focus priorities in addressing legal problems.
Finally, the progressive practitioner can look to the developing body
of race theory scholarship for a more contextualized and interdisciplinary approach to legal problem-solving. With the increasing conservatism of federal and state courts, practitioners must embrace a broader
and more eclectic vision of lawyering for social change. Whether the
issue is gang profiles or an even farther-reaching question of community
dynamics, it is imperative for the practitioner to realize that familiar
legal terrain may need to be supplemented or even supplanted by new
70
strategies.
Conclusion: Toward a Convergence of Theory and Practice
The "Theoretics of Practice" conference provided an opportunity
for students, practitioners, and scholars to address the shared longing of
which Cornel West has written-the "longing for norms and values that
can make a difference... that can change our desperate plight."'7 1 The
growing community of critical race scholars shares that yearning as well,
and seeks to foster an integration of theory and practice to address the
desperate plight of racism's victims. Such a goal is neither simple nor
singular, for the manifestations of racial prejudice in our culture and in
our legal system are manifold and deeply rooted. Therefore, it is perhaps
better to explore not one but many convergences among our respective
communities, in the hope of achieving an ultimate vision of lawyering for
social change that is eclectic, inclusive, and truly liberatory.
70. In recent months, for example, a number of school districts throughout the country
have attempted to address the nationwide crisis of school violence by instituting antigang
"dress codes" for elementary and high school students. See, eg., Oakland Unified School
District Dress Code (1991) (on file with author). Although the impetus for such codes is
understandable, their more restrictive provisions suggest that they may eventually function as
institutionalized "gang profiles" in the school setting. Given the urgency of community determination to eliminate school violence and the likelihood that young students of color will
suffer disproportionately from the administration of dress codes, it is likely that a communityoriented practitioner would not seek solutions primarily through litigation. Rather, she might
want to meet with a variety of community groups (students, parents, teachers, administrators)
and seek extralegal solutions to this complex web of problems.
71. WEsT,supra note I.

